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Assessing U.S. Justifications for Using Force in
Response to Syria’s Chemical Attacks:
An International Law Perspective
Michael N. Schmitt* & Christopher M. Ford**
INTRODUCTION
On April 6, 2017, the United States launched an attack employing fifty-nine
U.S. Navy Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles against the Al Shayrat airfield in
response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons against civilians two days earlier.1
The cruise missile strikes constituted the most robust example of military
intervention without United Nations Security Council approval on the basis of
human suffering since the 1999 NATO bombing campaign to end abuse of the
Kosovar Albanians by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.2 They sparked an
impassioned debate regarding the legality and legitimacy of the operation under
both domestic and international law.3
This article examines the administration’s statements justifying the operation.
Although none of them was articulated in the patois of international law, we
attempt to categorize and assess the explanations from that perspective. Three
possible legal bases merit attention: self-defense, response to an internationally
wrongful act, and humanitarian intervention. In our view, the U.S. actions run
afoul of limitations resident in each body of law.
Of particular note is the last, for the operation had the feel of humanitarian
intervention. Although long the subject of serious scholarship,4 the validity of
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1. Michael R. Gordon, Helene Cooper, and Michael D. Shear, Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base
in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-
weigh-military-responses-to-syrian-chemical-attack.html.
2. See INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 94 (2000), http://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256989005CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf.
3. See e.g., Marty Lederman, Why the Strikes Against Syria Probably Violate the U.N. Charter and
(therefore) the U.S. Constitution, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39674/syrian-
strikes-violate-u-n-charter-constitution/; Marko Milanovic, The Clearly Illegal US Missile Strike in
Syria, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-clearly-illegal-us-missile-strike-in-syria/;
Ashley Deeks, How Does the Syrian Situation Stack up to the “Factors” that Justified Intervention in
Kosovo?, LAWFARE (Apr. 7, 2017, 8:28 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/how-does-syria-situation-stack-
thefactors-justified-intervention-kosovo.
4. See e.g., Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
824 (1999); Harold H. Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 971
(2016); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1
(1999); Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, 10 FIN. Y.B. OF INT’L
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humanitarian intervention as a basis for the lawful use of force on another
State’s territory without that State’s consent or the imprimatur of the United
Nations Security Council remains the subject of significant disagreement.5 The
missile strikes not only raised the issue anew, but, in our view, were norma-
tively consequential. They amounted to State practice that contributed to the
crystallization of a customary law right to humanitarian intervention. Arguably,
they also influenced the conditions precedent to the exercise of that purported
right. We conclude our assessment by offering a tentative suggestion that the
international community is likely to consider the nature of suffering, in addition
to the quantum thereof, as bearing on the right of States to mount future
humanitarian operations.
I. UNRAVELING THE U.S. JUSTIFICATIONS
The missile strikes into Syria targeted “aircraft, hardened aircraft shelters,
petroleum and logistical storage, ammunition supply bunkers, air defense sys-
tems, and radars.”6 They followed a chemical weapons attack against civilians
in Khan Sheikhoun, Syria that the United States concluded had been conducted
by the Syrian armed forces, employing assets located at the airfield.7 Albeit
horrific, and involving the use of a weapon that is universally condemned as
unlawful per se, Syria’s attack left fewer than one hundred civilians dead. The
situation was not one of widespread human distress over an extended period,
which usually foreshadows external intervention on humanitarian grounds.
Nevertheless, the U.S. actions received broad support from the international
community, while being condemned by only a few States.8
L. 141 (1999); Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
107 (2006). Our initial thoughts on the subject were set forth in Michael Schmitt & Chris Ford, The Use
of Force in Response to Syrian Chemical Attacks: Emergence of a New Norm?, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 8,
2017, 12:43 PM) https://www.justsecurity.org/39805/force-response-syrian-chemical-attacks-emergence-
norm/.
5. This question is not addressed by the Articles of State Responsibility. See Int’l Law Comm’n,
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries,
Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at art. 25, commentary ¶ 21 (2001),
reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM. 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinaf-
ter Articles on State Responsibility].
6. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Statement from Pentagon Spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis on U.S. Strike in
Syria, Release No. NR-126-17 (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-
Release-View/Article/1144598/statement-from-pentagon-spokesman-capt-jeff-davis-on-us-strike-in-
syria/ [hereinafter Davis Statement].
7. Id.
8. Countries expressly supporting the U.S. action include the United Kingdom, Germany, France,
Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Italy, Poland, the U.A.E., Japan, and Canada. Countries
opposing the action include Syria, Russia, Iran, and Bolivia. Gregor Aisch, Yonette Joseph & Anjali
Singhvi, What Countries Support and Which Oppose the U.S. Missile Strikes in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/07/world/middleeast/world-reactions-syria-strike.
html.
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After the operation, senior U.S. officials offered varying justifications for
taking the action.9 We have grouped their statements based on the possible
underlying legal basis. This is to an extent an artificial construct, for the
administration has not publicly offered a definitive explanation of the legal
grounds for the U.S. use of force.10 Accordingly, the categories are merely a
heuristic to organize the legal analysis. Indeed, some statements can be classi-
fied under more than one category.
The first group of statements invoke the notion of “preventative action” to
stop the spread of chemical weapons. Notably, the President issued a statement
that referenced the need to protect the “vital national security interest of the
United States to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical
weapons.”11 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson echoed the President’s comments,
defending the strikes as part of an effort to prevent chemical weapons from
“falling into the hands” of “elements that are plotting to reach our shore,”12
while Secretary of Defence James Mattis spoke of a need to “deter future use of
chemical weapons.”13 The DoD spokesperson declared that the strikes were
“intended to deter the regime from using chemical weapons again”14 and White
House Press Secretary Sean Spicer indicated the operation was intended “to
stop the proliferation and the deterrence [sic] of chemical weapons.”15 National
Security Advisor H.R. McMaster likewise emphasized the goal of deterring
their later use.16
9. See Kate Brannen, Tracking the White House’s Reasons for Bombing Syria, JUST SECURITY (Apr.
11, 2017, 12:16 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/39864/track-white-houses-reasons-striking-syria/.
10. Compare Charlie Savage, Watchdog Group Sues Trump Administration, Seeking Legal Rationale
Behind Syria Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/world/middleeast/
syria-united-protect-democracy-trump-lawsuit.html with Caroline D. Krass, Memorandum Opinion for
the Attorney General: Authority to Use Military Force in Libya (Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya_0.pdf (providing the legal ba-
sis for the use of force in Libya). https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/
authority-military-use-in-libya_0.pdf (providing the legal basis for the use of force in Libya).
11. Donald J. Trump, U.S. President (Apr. 6, 2017) in N.Y. TIMES, Transcript and Video: Trump
Speaks about Strikes in Syria (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/
transcript-video-trump-airstrikes-syria.html.
12. Rex W. Tillerson, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks with National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster,
(Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/269543.htm [hereinafter Tillerson Re-
marks].
13. James Mattis, U.S. Sec’y of Defense, Statement by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis on the U.S.
Military Response to the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.
defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1146758/statement-by-secretary-of-
defense-jim-mattis-on-the-us-military-response-to-the/.
14. Davis Statement, supra note 6.
15. Erik Wemple, The Daily Spicer: Press Secretary Discusses Policy Toward “Bissaa al-Ashar”,
WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2017/04/10/the-
daily-spicer-press-secretary-hatches-new-war-acronym-mwd/.
16. Interview by Chris Wallace with H.R. McMaster, U.S. Nat. Sec. Advisor, FOX NEWS (Apr. 9,
2017), http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2017/04/09/exclusive-general-h-r-mcmaster-on-decision-to-
strike-syria.html [hereinafter McMaster Interview].
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A second group of statements alluded to Syria’s breach of its international
obligations. The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Nikki Haley, pointed to Syria’s
“violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention” and “a violation of the U.N.
Security Council resolutions,”17 while Tillerson used similar language, indicat-
ing that the President “is willing to act when governments and actors “cross the
line on violating commitments they’ve made.”18
The final group of statements highlighted the humanitarian aspects of the
operation. Haley remarked that “I can tell you that [the President’s] focus was
on the fact that innocent victims were hurt.”19 In initial remarks to reporters,
Spicer similarly noted, “there’s a huge humanitarian component to this.”20 A
few days later, he commented, “when you watch babies and children being
gassed and suffer under barrel bombs, you are instantaneously moved to
action.”21 Deputy Assistant to the President Sebastian Gorka argued, “when evil
happens and you are able to do something about it, you do something about
it.”22 Finally, McMaster referenced “mass murder attacks against innocent
civilians.”23
These statements evidence the underlying impetus for the missile strikes, but
they fail to set forth the administration’s legal basis with either perspicuity,
granularity, or transparency. If a formal legal analysis was conducted, as it
presumably was, the resulting legal opinion has not been officially released.
Rather, a document entitled “Basis for Using Force” that reportedly circulated
within the government became public, but unfortunately, like the aforemen-
tioned statements, merely presented a series of quasi-legal arguments that shed
little light on the matter.24
Nevertheless, the groups of statements can be thought of as loosely invoking
three legal bases for the operations. Those focusing on prevention imply
justification based upon the self-defense exception to the prohibition on the use
of force. Statements referring to violations of international law may be viewed
from the perspective of the law of State responsibility. Finally, statements
referencing suffering suggest the humanitarian intervention exception, if any, to
17. Olivia Beavers, Haley: Attack on Syria “One of the President’s Finest Hours,” The Hill, Apr. 9,
2017.
18. Tillerson Remarks, supra note 12.
19. Angela Dewan, US Envoy Nikki Haley say Syria Regime Change is Inevitable, CNN, Apr. 10,
2017.
20. Sean Spicer, White House Press Sec’y, Press Gaggle (Apr. 7, 2017) (transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/07/press-gaggle-press-secretary-sean-spicer).
21. John T. Bennett, After Syria Strike, Trump Administration Talks Tough, Roll Call, Apr. 17, 2017.
22. Laura Ingram & Sebastian Gorka, DR. SEBASTIAN GORKA INTERVIEW ON THE LAURA INGRAHAM
SHOW LAURA INGRAM SHOW (Apr. 7, 2017).
23. McMaster Interview, supra note 16.
24. Basis for Using Force, (Apparent) Administration Justifications for Legality of Strikes Against
Syria, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39803/apparent-administration-
justifications-legality-strikes-syria/. New York Times reporter Charlie Savage described the document
as unsigned talking points. Charlie Savage, Watchdog Group Sues Trump Administration, Seeking Legal
Rationale Behind Syria Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2017) [hereinafter Basis for Using Force].
286 [Vol. 9:283JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY
the prohibition on the use of force. The legal analysis that follows is organized
around these three normative strands that “preclude the wrongfulness” of a
State’s resort to force under international law.25
II. ASSESSING THE U.S. JUSTIFICATIONS
Before assessing the U.S. justifications from a legal point of view, it is useful
to dispense with one red herring, the jus in bello issue of commencement of an
armed conflict under international humanitarian law. Clearly, the United States
and Syria are involved in an international armed conflict because the former
engaged in hostilities against the armed forces of the latter; it will continue until
there is a prolonged cessation of hostilities.26 This conclusion is in accord with
both the ICRC27 and DoD28 interpretations of when such conflicts are triggered
and end. Existence of the conflict is of no consequence for the purposes of this
article, for conflict classification does not bear on the legality of the use of force
under the jus ad bellum.
As to the jus ad bellum, a military strike by one State targeting the forces of
another is the paradigmatic example of a violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, which prohibits the “threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the purposes of the United Nations.”29 This provision reflects custom-
25. For the grounds for precluding wrongfulness of a State’s action or omission, see Articles on State
Responsibility, supra note 5, pt. 1, ch. V.
26. This temporal conclusion precludes what trial chamber in Gotovina referred to as a “revolving
door between applicability and nonapplicability.” Prosecutor v. Gotovina and Marc, Case No. IT-06-
90-T, Judgment, ¶ 1694 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011). See also Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 6, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (“the application of the present Convention shall cease on the general close of military
operations.”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 3 June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (“the
application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease . . . on the general close of military
operations, and, in the case of occupied territories, on the termination of the occupation . . .”).
27. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentaries to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions make clear that an international armed conflict exists whenever there are hostilities
between States. This is so irrespective of “how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes
place.” E.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (2d
ed., 2016).
28. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 3.4.2 (2016)
[hereinafter DoD Manual] (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State to American Embassy at Damascus, Telegram
348126, Dec. 8, 1983, in 3 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3456,
3457 (1981-1988 eds.) (the United States considers an armed conflict to exist in “any situation in which
there is hostile action between the armed forces of two parties, regardless of the duration, intensity or
scope of the fighting.”)); id. § 3.8.1.2 (2016) (“Hostilities generally would not be deemed to have
ceased without an agreement, unless the conditions clearly indicate that they are not be resumed or
there has been a lapse of time indicating the improbability of resumption.”).
29. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
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ary international law and is considered a jus cogens norm.30 There are two U.N.
Charter-based exceptions to the prohibition: Security Council authorization or
mandate under Chapter VII and self-defense pursuant to Article 51 (and custom-
ary international law).31 Consent is a universally accepted extra-charter basis for
the use of force on another State’s territory, although it is improbable a State
would consent to the use of force against its own military.32 Unsettled custom-
ary law exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force may include forcible
countermeasures, the plea of necessity, and humanitarian intervention.
With respect to the Syria case, there has been no Security Council authoriza-
tion or mandate for the use of force in response to the chemical weapons attack
and Syria self-evidently did not consent to the attack on its facilities.33 This
leaves self-defense, countermeasures, necessity, and humanitarian intervention.
A. Preventive Action: Self-Defense
Recall that the President, Secretary of Defense, White House Press Secretary,
and National Security Advisor raised the issues of deterrence to prevent the
future use of chemical weapons by Syria (and presumably other States) and
counter-proliferation. These statements accordingly suggest a self-defense justi-
fication for the missile strikes, albeit one expressed in the vernacular of preven-
tion, rather than as a response to an ongoing or imminent attack.
The modern law of self-defense finds its origins in Daniel Webster’s correspon-
dence in the Caroline case, in which he opined that there must be a “necessity
of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation” before resorting to force, and that said use must not be
“unreasonable or excessive.”34 This construction has since been interpreted as
articulating the customary law requirements for self-defense, which today exist
alongside with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.35 Article 51 provides that States
have an “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
30. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v U.S.), Judgment, 1986
ICJ Rep. 14, ¶¶ 187-191 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. See also Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, art. 53, commentary ¶ 1 [1966] 2 YB INT’L L. COMM. 187.
31. U.N. Charter arts. 42 and 51, respectively. On the customary law nature of the self-defense
exception, see Nicaragua, supra note 30, ¶ 176.
32. See Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study
on Targeted Killings) Report, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, ¶ 35 (May 28, 2010). On consent as a
ground precluding the wrongfulness of an act, see Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, art. 20.
33. Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the U.N., Identical letters dated Sept.
17, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/719
(Sep. 21, 2015), Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the U.N., Identical letters
dated Sept. 17, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2015/727 (Sep. 22, 2015).
34. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1840–1).
35. Nicaragua, supra note 30, ¶ 176 (customary international law on self-defense “continues to exist
alongside treaty law”).
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attack occurs.”36 The International Court of Justice has confirmed that self-
defense must be necessary and proportionate.37
Self-defense may be individual (national) or collective. With respect to the
former, for example, the United States has asserted a right of individual
self-defense against “al-Qaida elements in Syria known as the Khorasan Group
to address terrorist threats that they pose to the United States and our partners
and allies.”38 Individual self-defense is not a viable basis for the use of force in
the instant case since Syria’s chemical weapons attack was not directed at the
United States. As to the latter, collective defense may only be conducted at the
request and on behalf of another State that is facing an armed attack.39 The U.S.
operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, for example, are being taken in the
collective defense of Iraq.40 Syria, by contrast, used chemical weapons against
its own citizens, not another State. Since no other State was the subject of an
armed attack, there was obviously no request in fact or law to the United States
for collective defense.
U.S. officials discussing the missile strikes seem, however, to be alluding to a
right of “preventative” self-defense. There is a longstanding debate over whether
States enjoy the right to use defensive force before the underlying armed attack
is launched.41 The prevailing understanding is that they may act to preempt an
“imminent” attack.42 Such an action has traditionally been branded “anticipa-
tory self-defense” in international law.
To the extent there exists a right to anticipatory self-defense, there are
limits.43 In our view, international law requires that the State that will suppos-
edly launch the armed attack have the capability and intent to conduct an armed
attack. It also limits the taking of defensive action to the last window of
36. U.N. Charter art. 51.
37. Nicaragua, supra note 30, ¶ 94; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶
43 (Nov. 6).
38. Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from
the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014).
39. Nicaragua, supra note 30, ¶ 199.
40. Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from
the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014).
41. Terry D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defense: Anticipation, Pre-emption, Prevention
and Immediacy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 113 (Michael
N. Schmitt and Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
42. See, e.g., DoD Manual, supra note 28, § 1.11.5.1 (“Under customary international law, States
had, and continue to have, the right to take measures in response to imminent attacks.”); Lord Peter
Henry Goldsmith, Attorney General, Oral Answers to Questions, 660 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2004)
370-71 (UK) (“it has been the consistent position of successive United Kingdom Governments over
many years that the right of self-defence under international law includes the right to use force where
an armed attack is imminent.”).
43. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 233 (5th ed. 2011); Daniel
Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or
Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 2 AM. J. OF INT’L. L. 106 (2012).
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opportunity available to effectively defend oneself.44 In this case, there is no
evidence to suggest that Syria intended to launch chemical weapons, or any
other weapons for that matter, against either its neighbors or the United States
(including U.S. forces in the region) in the future. In the absence of a reasonable
conclusion that Syria harbors such an intent, the purported defensive action is
purely preventive in nature.45 Such operations are unlawful. International law
only countenances the use of force, even defensive force, as an option of last
resort in the face of an attack that is almost surely going to manifest. Deterrence
and counter-proliferation are not grounds for employing force against another
State.
There is accordingly no basis for relying on the law of self-defense to justify
the U.S. missile strikes. This is so with respect to both individual and collective
defense, and includes actions that might be characterized as anticipatory.
B. Breach of International Law Obligations: State Responsibility
The second group of statements indicate the U.S. missile strikes were in part
a response to Syria’s failure to abide by its international legal obligations
regarding chemical weapons. This raises the issues of internationally wrongful
acts and the appropriate responses thereto under the law of State responsibility.
In particular, it must be determined whether Syria’s use of chemical weapons
violated any obligation it owed the United States or another State and, if so,
whether forceful countermeasures or the use of force based on the plea of
necessity were permissible.
1. Countermeasures
The use of chemical weapons is irrefutably banned. Such use is prohibited in
the first instance by the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol46 and the Chemical Weapons
Convention.47 Syria is Party to both instruments, as is the United States. This
being so, Syria’s use of them was an “internationally wrongful act,” for it
breached a legal obligation owed the other Parties to the treaties.48 Since they
do not address the use of force or other remedial measures designed to enforce
their provisions, any responses by States Parties to a breach is left to the realm
of the law of State responsibility.
44. Michael N. Schmitt, Pre-Emptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 513,
546 (2003).
45. Oil Platforms, supra note 37, ¶ 64. See also Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of International
Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence 5 (Oct. 2005), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/
papers/view/108106. But cf William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE
J. INT’L. L. 295, 302 (2004).
46. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
47. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemi-
cal Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
48. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, arts. 1-2.
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The prohibition on the use of chemical weapons is also universally accepted
as customary international law.49 This raises the issue of to whom the obligation
to refrain from their use is owed. In Barcelona Traction, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) confirmed the existence of obligations erga omnes, which are
obligations owed to the entire international community.50 The International Law
Commission’s non-binding but authoritative Articles on State Responsibility
endorse the concept of obligations erga omnes,51 according to which “every
State, by virtue of its membership in the international community, has a legal
interest in the protection of certain basic rights and the fulfillment of certain
essential obligations.”52
It must consequently be determined whether the use of chemical weapons
violates an obligation erga omnes. The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia has characterized obligations erga omnes as deriving from
the “outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, [and] also from the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person.”53 It is
reasonable to contend that, given the universally accepted and long-standing
ban on the use of chemical weapons in any circumstance, a duty to refrain from
their use against civilians qualifies as such an obligation. Assuming, arguendo,
that the prohibition on the use of a chemical weapons is an obligation erga
omnes, Syria has breached a customary international law obligation owed to all
States.
States to whom a breached treaty or customary law obligation is owed are
entitled to various remedies under international law. These include the right to
demand cessation, seek assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, receive
reparations, and take countermeasures.54 In the instant case, countermeasures
are the most relevant. Countermeasures are acts (which include both actions and
omissions) that would otherwise be unlawful but for the fact that they are taken
to “ensure the cessation of the wrongful act and reparation for its conse-
quences.”55 There are two obstacles to styling the U.S. missile strikes as a
countermeasure.
First, it is uncertain whether countermeasures may include actions at the use
of force level. The Articles on State Responsibility take the position that they
49. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY 259 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005); DoD Manual, supra note 28, § 6.8.2. See also Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xviii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (confirming that the
use of chemical weapons is also a war crime in customary international law).
50. See Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction (Spain v. Belg.), Judgment, 1970 ICJ 3, ¶ 33
(Feb. 5).
51. See Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 5, arts. 33, 42(b).
52. Id., art. 1, commentary ¶ 4.
53. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at ¶ 34.
54. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, arts. 22, 29-31.
55. Id., General Commentary, ¶ 6.
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are limited to non-forcible actions.56 A contrary position, expressed most lucidly
by Judge Simma in his separate opinion in the Oil Platforms judgement, is that
forcible countermeasures might be appropriate so long as the acts comprising
them do not rise to the level of an “armed attack” as contemplated in the law of
self-defense.57 The merits of this position need not be addressed, however, as an
operation involving the use of 59 cruise missiles clearly exceeds the armed
attack threshold. Thus, the operation cannot be justified as a countermeasure.
Second, under the law of State responsibility, a State is entitled to invoke the
responsibility of another State, in this case Syria, if the obligation is owed to a
group of States of which both are members. All States may do so in the case of
obligations erga omnes.58 Yet, the chemical weapons were used solely against
Syrian civilians. No other State suffered harm because of the Syrian violation of
the treaties and the possible obligation erga omnes prohibiting the use of
chemical weapons. It is unclear in international law whether States in these
circumstances are entitled to take countermeasures, even if the missile strikes
had otherwise qualified as such.59 They may arguably only demand cessation,
assurances, and guarantees.60
Note that in addition to treaty and customary law, Syria is also in breach of
Security Council Resolution 2118, adopted after Syria’s first use of chemical
weapons on August 21, 2013.61 That resolution endorsed the Framework for the
Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons adopted by the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.62 Yet, neither Resolution 2118 nor the
Framework envision the use of force by individual States in response to a
Syrian breach. Since the Security Council has not authorized or mandated such
action, violation of the resolution provides no basis for the U.S. missile strikes.
On the contrary, on February 28, 2017, Russia and China vetoed Security
Council Draft Resolution 172, which would have authorized a resort to force in
response to the use of chemical weapons.63 This was the seventh and sixth veto
respectively for Russia and China on matters related to Syria.64
56. Id. at art. 50(1)(a). See also Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in
Accordance with Annex VII, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Guy. v. Surin.), Award,
¶ 466 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
57. Oil Platforms, supra note 37, at ¶¶ 13-16 (separate opinion by Judge Simma).
58. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, art. 48(1)(b).
59. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, r. 24.,
commentary ¶ 5 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter Tallinn Manual].
60. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, at art. 48(2)(a).
61. See S.C. Res. 2118 (Sept. 27, 2013).
62. Id. at 2 (citing G.A. Res. A/68/398-S/2013/565 (Sept. 24, 2013)).
63. See U.N. Doc. S/2017/172 (Feb. 28, 2017).
64. U.N. Doc. S/2016/1026 (Dec. 5, 2016); U.N. Doc. S/2016/846 (Oct. 8, 2016); U.N. Doc.
S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014); U.N. Doc. S/2012/538 (Jul. 19, 2012); U.N. Doc. S/2012/77 (Feb. 4,
2012); U.N. Doc. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2011).
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2. Plea of Necessity
A second ground for taking measures that would otherwise be unlawful is the
plea of necessity. There have been suggestions that perhaps the plea may
provide a ground for the preclusion of the wrongfulness of the U.S. use of force
under the law of State responsibility.65 We disagree.
The plea allows States to respond to situations that present a “grave and
imminent” danger to their “essential interests” by means of an otherwise
internationally wrongful act(s) if doing so is the sole means of safeguarding
those interests.66 Recently, an international group of experts considered whether
the interests of the international community as a whole, which might manifest in
the event of the use of chemical weapons, qualify as an essential interest for the
purposes of the plea. Most of them agreed, rightly in our view, that only the
interests of States that are facing the danger so qualify.67 By this interpretation,
States other than Syria cannot resort to the plea to justify forceful action
designed to end the use of chemical weapons on Syrian soil. Moreover, even
these experts were divided as to whether forceful responses based on the plea
are lawful in the first place.68
It may be concluded, then, that although the Syrian chemical attacks were, as
certain administration officials correctly noted, violations of international law,
that fact did not alone justify the use of force against Syria.
C. Human Suffering: Humanitarian Intervention
The third cohort of administration statements invoked humanitarian consider-
ations, albeit without citing humanitarian intervention as an explicit legal basis
for the missile strikes. Nevertheless, humanitarian intervention is the only
possible legal basis for using force to terminate humanitarian excesses without
the authorization or mandate of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter. As noted, the existence of such a right is an unsettled matter
among States and international law scholars.
Conceptually, humanitarian intervention can be traced to the Just War tradi-
tion. Grotius argued that nations that “provoke their people to despair and
resistance by unheard of cruelties” forfeit “the rights of independent sovereigns,
and can no longer claim the privilege of the law of nations.”69 By the nineteenth
century, the doctrine enjoyed widespread, but not universal, support.70 For
65. Koh, supra note 4, at 1010-1012.
66. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, art. 25.
67. See Tallinn Manual, supra note 59, at r. 26, commentary ¶ 3.
68. Id., r. 26, commentary ¶ 18.
69. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI, Book II, ch. XXV, 8 (1625). See also EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS, vol. 2, ch. IV, ¶¶ 55-56 (1758).
70. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338 (1963). But cf HENRY
G. HODGES, THE DOCTRINE OF INTERVENTION 87 (1915) (“[a]s regards an intervention taken in the cause of
humanity there seems to be a divergence of opinion among the most prominent writers . . .”) (alteration
in original).
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instance, examples of force being used, ostensibly on humanitarian grounds,
include Great Britain, France, and Russia in Greece (1827); France in Syria
(1860); Austria, Great Britain, France, Prussia and Russia in the Mount Leba-
non Civil War (1860); Russia in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria (1877); the
United States in Cuba (1898); and Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia in Macedonia
(1903, 1912).71
Some commentators question the humanitarian basis of those interventions.
For example, in 1963 Ian Brownlie suggested that “state practice justifies the
conclusion that no genuine case of humanitarian intervention has occurred, with
the possible exception of Syria in 1860 and 1861.”72 Indeed, by the twentieth
century, most support for the premise that States may take military action in
other States on humanitarian grounds had trailed off.73
Despite codification of key jus ad bellum principles in the U.N. Charter, the
matter has not been settled. There is a general sense that a customary interna-
tional law norm allowing humanitarian intervention in limited circumstances
might be slowly emerging74 and several prominent commentators have en-
dorsed the concept.75 Yet, crystallization of a customary law ground precluding
the wrongfulness of an action (here the use of force) requires rather conclusive
State practice and opinio juris.76
71. J.L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL,
LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 45 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane, eds., 2003).
72. BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 340.
73. A notable exception in this regard were the views of renowned international law scholar Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht. Id. at 341 (citing HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF
MAN 46 (1945)).
74. See Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation
of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 23
(1999); Adam Roberts, NATO’s Humanitarian War over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 120 (Aug. 1999)
(NATO operations in Kosovo may be a “halting step in a developing but still contested practice of using
force in defence of international norms.”); Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial Comments: NATO’s Kosovo
Intervention: NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 834 (Oct. 1999) (“At the same
time, it is important to acknowledge that the Kosovo intervention may represent a sea change in the
responsibility of multilateral organizations to attempt to thwart ethnic slaughter . . . .”).
75. See Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment—The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle of
Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-
moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention/; Koh, supra note 4; Chris-
topher Greenwood, Memorandum Submitted by Christopher Greenwood to the Select Committee on
Foreign Affairs (May 11, 2000), https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/
28/0020802.htm; Thomas M. Franck, Humanitarian and Other Interventions, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 321, 326-27 (2005) (Referencing humanitarian intervention, Franck writes, “[t]o use a simile coined
by Simon Chesterman, the problem is to distinguish between the rare instances in which vigilante
justice is the last hope of the victim in distress from those in which every gunslinger seeks to be
empowered by a sheriff’s badge. The answer must be found in devising a process for separating the
sheep of socially-justified non-compliance from the goats of self-interested law-breaking.”).
76. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3,
¶¶ 70-74 (Feb. 20). See also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 61 (1970)
(“International law custom signifies constant and uniform practice followed by States as a matter of
obligation.”).
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State expressions of support for the right of humanitarian intervention are
sparse. The most significant and explicit expression of such opinio juris is that
cited above, the UK Prime Minister’s Office’s policy paper issued following the
use of chemical weapons in Eastern Damascus on August 21, 2013.77 The paper
unequivocally asserts the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention “in order to
alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by
deterring and disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian
regime.”78 Furthermore, in January 2014, the Minister of State, Sir Hugh
Robertson, affirmed the United Kingdom’s acceptance of humanitarian interven-
tion as a basis for the use of force.79 Although the United Kingdom did not
reference humanitarian intervention in its November 2014 notice to the Security
Council with respect the UK’s use of force in Syria,80 the Attorney General later
confirmed the UK’s support of a right to intervene on humanitarian grounds in a
January 2017 speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.81
The United Kingdom’s position regarding Syria is in keeping with statements
made following the 1999 NATO operations in the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via. In debate at the Security Council, it noted that the military action regarding
Kosovo “is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”82 In the same proceedings, the Dutch
ambassador remarked “we cannot sit back and simply let the humanitarian
catastrophe occur. In such a situation, we will act on the legal basis we have
available.”83 Belgium subsequently argued before the International Court of
Justice that the NATO action was “an armed humanitarian intervention, compat-
ible with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, which covers only intervention
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State.”84
77. See Statement, Office of the Prime Minister, Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK
Government Legal Position (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter P.M. Office Statement] https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-
weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version.
78. Id.
79. See Letter from the Rt. Hon. Hugh Robertson MP, U.K. Minister of State, Foreign & Common-
wealth Office, to the Rt. Hon. Sir Richard Ottaway MP, U.K. House of Commons (Jan. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter Robertson Letter] https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Letter-from-
UK-Foreign-Commonwealth-Office-to-the-House-of-Commons-Foreign-Affairs-Committee-on-
Humanitarian-Intervention-and-the-Responsibility-to-Protect.pdf.
80. U.N. Doc. S/2014/851 (Nov. 26, 2014) (the UK noted that it was “taking measures in support of
the collective self-defence of Iraq.”); see Statement to Parliament about Iraq: Coalition Against ISIL,
Prime Minister David Cameron (Sept. 26, 2014) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/
cmhansrd/cm140926/debtext/140926-0001.htm#1409266000252).
81. See Jeremy Wright, Attorney General, Speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies:
The Modern Law of Self-Defence 6 (Jan. 11, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.justsecurity.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/01/United-Kingdom-Attorney-General-Speech-modern-law-of-self-defense-
IISS.pdf).
82. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24, 1999).
83. Statement of Peter van Walsum U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988.
84. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), Oral Pleadings of Belgium, 1999 I.C.J. Pleadings 12
(May 10, 1999, 3:00 PM).
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The U.N. Security Council has sometimes approved humanitarian interven-
tions after their launch. Such approval would logically be inconsistent with the
unlawfulness of the operations ab initio. For example, in August 1990, the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened militarily
in Liberia in the face of a humanitarian crisis.85 According to the ECOWAS
committee charged with addressing the conflict, “there is a government in
Liberia which cannot govern and contending factions which are holding the
entire population as hostage, depriving them of food, health facilities and other
basic necessities of life.”86 Although the President of Liberia, Samuel Doe, had
requested ECOWAS intervention,87 at the time he was “trapped within the
executive mansion” and exercised no control over the country; thus, he was
arguably no longer functioning as the leader of the Liberian government.88 In
any event, EOCWAS’ actions, which were not authorized by the U.N. Security
Council, did not conform to Doe’s request.89 The President of the Security
Council nevertheless issued a statement in January 1991 commending “the
efforts made by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government to promote
peace and normalcy in Liberia.”90
Similarly, the sectarian and tribal conflict that was precipitated by the ouster
of Somalia’s President, Siad Barre, in 1991 led to a humanitarian catastrophe.91
Humanitarian assistance missions were launched into the country, including
Operation Provide Relief in August of the following year. Provide Relief was
supported by elements of the U.S. Army 5th Special Forces Group.92 Despite
some U.N. coordination with the Somali Charge D’Affaires, Somalia did not
consent to the U.S. and international actions.93 Additionally, the Security Coun-
cil expressly authorized the use of force under Chapter VII only in December.94
Yet, several Security Council resolutions passed after Operation Provide Relief
commended States for providing humanitarian assistance.95
In 1997, ECOWAS intervened militarily in Sierra Leone by overthrowing a
rebel junta and restoring the democratically elected government. ECOWAS’
85. Comfort Ero, ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia, J. OF HUMAN. ASSISTANCE
(Sept. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Ero], https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/66.
86. ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, Final Communique´ of
the First Session, 7 August 1990, Document 54, quoted in Comfort Ero, supra note 85.
87. Ero, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 156
(2002).
90. S.C. Pres. Note S/22133 (Jan. 22, 1991).
91. RICHARD W. STEWART, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN SOMALIA 1992-1994, at 6
(1994).
92. Id. at 8.
93. Somalia, UNOSOM I Background Rep., http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/
unosom1backgr2.html (“Somalia remained without a central government with which to negotiate . . . .
Several of the Somali de facto authorities refused to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops
to secure delivery of aid in areas of greatest need.”).
94. S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 11 (Dec. 3, 1992).
95. Id.; S.C. Res. 746 (Mar. 17, 1992); S.C. Res. 767 (July 24, 1992); S.C. Res. 775 (Aug. 28, 1992).
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actions plainly went beyond any authority granted by then-existing Security
Council resolutions.96 Still, a subsequent Security Council Resolution expressed
“strong support for the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee to resolve the crisis
in Sierra Leone . . . .”97
More recently, France’s 2013 use of force in Mali exemplifies post hoc
Security Council endorsement. The French Foreign Minister asserted that the
use of force came in response “to a formal request by the Malian President and
is being conducted in accordance with the UN Charter, in compliance with
UNSCRs 2056, 2071 and 2085.”98 The claim of consent merits examination. At
the time of the operation, there was a “de facto partition of Mali between the
Islamists in the north and the Malian government in the south . . . .”99 The
interim President of the south provided the consent.100 As with President’s
Doe’s request for ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, it is not altogether clear that
he exercised the “effective control” of the State that was necessary under
international law to have had the authority to consent to France’s use of
force.101 And with respect to the cited resolutions, none included an authoriza-
tion for the use of force.102
Despite the questionable nature of the purported consent and the lack of
Security Council authorization, numerous countries, including Belgium, Den-
mark, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States, provided logistical sup-
port to the operation.103 For its part, the Security Council “[w]elcom[ed] the
swift action by the French forces, at the request of the transitional authorities of
Mali, to stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist and armed groups towards the
south of Mali.”104
Before launching the missile strikes against Syria, the United States had
participated in only a few humanitarian interventions, the most notable being
Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, which began in 1991, and NATO’s 1999
bombing campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The former was a
response to Iraq’s brutal suppression of the Kurds in northern Turkey after they
revolted against Saddam Hussein’s regime following the first Gulf War. Thou-
sands fled into the mountains of northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey to
96. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 227 (2000).
97. S.C. Res. 1132 (Oct. 8, 1997).
98. M. Laurent Fabius, French Foreign Minister, Press Conference (Jan. 14, 2013), http://reliefweb.
int/report/mali/press-conference-given-m-laurent-fabius-minister-foreign-affairs-january-14-2013.
99. MICHAEL SHURKIN, RAND CORP., FRANCE’S WAR IN MALI: LESSONS FOR AN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY 7
(2014).
100. Edward Cody, France’s Hollande Sends Troops to Mali, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2013), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/africa/frances-hollande-sends-troops-to-mali/2013/01/11/21be77ae-5c0f-
11e2-9fa9-5fbdc9530eb9_story.html?utm_term.0da3ddf4e392.
101. A government represents the State as long as it is in “effective control of that state.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW § 203 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
102. S.C. Res. 2056 (Jul. 5, 2012); S.C. Res. 2071 (Oct. 12, 2012); S.C. Res. 2085 (Dec. 20, 2012).
103. Fabius, supra note 98.
104. S.C. Res. 2100 (Apr. 25, 2013).
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escape the slaughter.105 In response, military personnel deployed from Austra-
lia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom to ensure their security and
encourage them to descend from the mountains where the oncoming winter
conditions would imperil them.106 The coalition coordinated with Iraqi military
personnel regarding their activities on Iraqi territory, but did not operate with
Iraq’s consent.107 On the contrary, the Iraqi representative negotiating with U.S.
military commanders “protested the entry of coalition forces into Iraq.”108
Subsequently, Iraqi forces were forced to leave a security zone adjacent to the
Turkish border, and a no-fly zone was established in northern Iraq above the
36th parallel to provide continuing protection. In 1992, the United States estab-
lished a similar no-fly zone in southern Iraq to protect the so-called marsh
Arabs.109
Initial statements from President Bush suggested the operation was a humani-
tarian action taken under Security Council Resolution 688.110 The plain lan-
guage of the resolution, however, provided no authority for the use of force in
northern Iraq. Rather, it merely “demand[ed]” that Iraq end its repression and
“insist[ed] that Iraq allow immediate access by the international humanitarian
organizations to all those in need of assistance.”111
On March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force to prevent the
ethnic cleansing of the minority Albanian population in the province of Kosovo
by the predominately Serbian forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY).112 From March 24 to June 9, NATO flew over 38,000 sorties, roughly a
third of which were attack missions.113 Although the threat of a Russian veto
precluded Security Council action, NATO’s Secretary General stated, “[w]e
must stop the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now
105. See generally GORDON W. RUDD, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ASSISTING THE IRAQI KURDS IN
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, 1991 (2004).
106. Id. at 226.
107. At the meeting between the senior U.S. military commander and the Iraqi emissary, the U.S.
general “explained the coalition’s objective of creating a security zone for the Kurds and then issued a
vigorous demarche stressing that coalition forces would cross the Iraqi border and enter Zakho the next
day . . . . At the same time, the State Department had sent another message to Iraqi diplomats,
explaining the demarche and warning them not to interfere.” Id. at 114.
108. Id. at 115.
109. Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., Briefing (Sept. 30, 2002), http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0209/30/se.05.html.
110. George Bush, President, Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference
(Apr. 16, 1991), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid19479. (This action was “made necessary by
the terrible human tragedy unfolding in and around Iraq . . . .” and is “[c]onsistent with United Nations
Security Council Resolution 688 . . . .”).
111. S.C. Res. 688 (Apr. 5, 1991).
112. RAND CORPORATION, OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: LESSONS FOR FUTURE COALITION OPERATIONS (2001),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB72/index1.html.
113. Capt. Gregory Ball, 1999 - Operation Allied Force, AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SUPPORT DIVISION
(Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458957/operation-allied-force/.
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taking place in Kosovo. We have a moral duty to do so.”114 At the time, NATO
consisted of nineteen member States. Since NATO operates by consensus, the
operation had to be approved by all 19 NATO nations.115
The day before the air campaign was launched, President Clinton character-
ized the situation as a “genocide in the heart of Europe,”116 and, recalling the
lessons of Bosnia, noted “if you don’t stand up to brutality and the killing of
innocent people, you invite the people who do it to do more of it. We learned
that firmness can save lives and stop armies.”117 The United Kingdom was more
explicit, urging that “force can be justified on the grounds of overwhelming
humanitarian necessity without a UNSCR.”118
Both the Iraq and Kosovo cases involved extended military operations con-
ducted by multiple countries, most of which are generally viewed as committed
to the international rule of law. Although there was neither consent nor Security
Council approval in the two cases, participating States employed force based on
dire humanitarian need. Unless one concludes that the States involved willingly
violated international law, they are strong indications that a customary norm
permitting intervention has been in the process of surfacing. Indeed, a recent
statement from the United Kingdom Minister of State notes that the United
Kingdom has invoked the doctrine of humanitarian intervention on three occa-
sions: protecting the Kurds in northern Iraq, no fly zones in north and south of
Iraq, and the use of force in Kosovo.119
Finally, when substantial humanitarian crises occur, States are often subjected
to criticism for failure to intervene. The most glaring failure in this regard is the
Rwandan genocide of 1994. Over the course of a mere 100 days, approximately
800,000 Rwandans were butchered.120 The failure of the international commu-
nity to intervene was widely condemned, including in a harsh internal UN
review.121 Further, the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty crafted its Responsibility to Protect concept as a means to avoid
“more Rwandas.”122 Similarly, commentators and civil society organizations
114. Press Release, Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General (Mar. 24, 1999), http://nato.int/docu/pr/
1999/p99-041e.htm.
115. NATO, NATO HANDBOOK 15 (2006), http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en-2006.pdf.
116. William J. Clinton, President of the United States, Remarks at the Legislative Convention of the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (Mar. 23, 1999), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid57294.
117. Id.
118. UK FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FRY/KOSOVO: THE WAY AHEAD; UK VIEW ON THE LEGAL
BASE FOR USE OF FORCE (1998), quoted in Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo, 41
Survival 102, 106 (1999).
119. Robertson Letter, supra note 79, at 3.
120. Rwandan Genocide: 100 Days of Slaughter, BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-26875506.
121. Rep. of the Indep. Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in
Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999).
122. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT at VIII
(2001).
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widely criticized the slow and inadequate response to the humanitarian crisis in
Darfur, Sudan, that began in 2003.123
Considering, inter alia, the evidence set forth above, it is becoming increas-
ingly difficult to deny that, if it has not already crystallized as some suggest, a
right of humanitarian intervention is emerging. States clearly find it legitimate
to intervene in cases of severe humanitarian crisis, even if a corresponding legal
right does not definitively exist. Repeated actions based on legitimacy are fertile
ground for the growth of new customary norms. The fact that the U.S. missile
strikes were justified based on the humanitarian imperative of deterring repeated
use of a horrendous weapon provides support in the form of State practice for
the crystallization of a right of humanitarian intervention.
Much of the apprehension about the emergence of humanitarian intervention
as a basis for the use of force concerns potential abuse by States.124 To address
that risk, commentators endorsing humanitarian intervention have proffered
preconditions that should be met before force is used to stop humanitarian
suffering in other countries.125 However, the best indicators of the conditions
under which humanitarian interventions are likely to be judged lawful are the
legal justifications put forth by States that engage in them and general expres-
sions opinio juris.
In this regard, the United Kingdom has articulated a test of cumulative factors
that must be met before a humanitarian intervention is lawful. By that test, such
operations may only be mounted when action is blocked in the Security
Council,
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale,
requiring immediate and urgent relief;
(ii) it [is] objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the
use of force if lives are to be saved; and
(iii) the proposed use of force [is] necessary and proportionate to the aim
of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and
scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for
no other purpose).126
In contrast, the United States has not acknowledged humanitarian interven-
tion as a ground for the use of force. Still, policy statements made in the
aftermath of Iraq, Kosovo, and Syria suggest the U.S. approach to undertaking
123. See, e.g., Michael Clough, Darfur: Whose Responsibility to Protect?, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/darfur/darfur.pdf.
124. See generally Goodman, supra note 4.
125. See generally, Ashley Deeks, Commentary: Multi-Part Tests in the Jus ad Bellum, 53 HOUS. L.
REV. 1035 (2016) (discussing multi-part tests from Harold Koh, the United Kingdom, the Independent
International Commission on Kosovo, the Danish Institute of International Affairs, and the International
Commission on International Affairs, citations omitted).
126. P.M. Office Statement, supra note 77; Robertson Letter, supra note 79.
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humanitarian military action is generally consistent with the UK position. It is
also remarkably unchanged over nearly two decades.
Consider the 1991 incursion into northern Iraq. While the stated U.S. justifica-
tion was enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 688, in various
statements President Bush justified the operation on the basis that it was (1) a
short-term measure designed to address humanitarian concerns;127 (2) in re-
sponse to a significant humanitarian crisis;128 (3) which had to potential to
destabilize the region;129 (4) and was taken with broad coalition support.130
Similarly, following the 1999 intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via, Michael Matheson, the Acting Legal Advisor for the Department of State,
noted that there was a pressing “danger of humanitarian disaster” and pointed to
the “inability of the [Security] Council to make a clear decision adequate to deal
with that disaster.”131 He also highlighted the potential for regional destabiliza-
tion, the significant multilateral support, and Yugoslavia’s violation of “obliga-
tions under international humanitarian agreements.”132 According to Matheson,
the use of force by NATO forces was proportionate and limited in duration.133
In the Syria case, the “Basis for Using Force” document cited earlier mentions
the existence of “severe humanitarian distress,” “widespread violations” of
international legal obligations, and potential for regional destabilization, and
argues that the use of force was necessary and proportionate to the aim of
preventing further Syrian use of chemical weapons.
To summarize, the United Kingdom and United States appear to accept the
following criteria for intervention. First, a certain quantum of harm must
manifest. The United Kingdom uses the term “extreme humanitarian dis-
tress,”134 while the United States variously refers to “humanitarian disaster,”135
127. Bush, supra note 110 (“And I want to stress that this new effort, despite its scale and scope, is
not intended as a permanent solution to the plight of the Iraqi Kurds. To the contrary, it is an interim
measure designed to meet an immediate, penetrating humanitarian need.”).
128. Id. (U.S. intervention in Iraq was “made necessary by the terrible human tragedy unfolding in
and around Iraq as a result of Saddam Hussein’s brutal treatment of Iraqi citizens.”) See also George
Bush, President, Statement on Aid to Iraqi Refugees (Apr. 5, 1991), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid19441, (“The human tragedy unfolding in and around Iraq demands immediate action on a
massive scale.”).
129. Id. (“At stake are not only the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women, and
children but the peace and security of the Gulf.”).
130. Bush, supra note 110 (“It is for this reason that this afternoon, following consultations with
Prime Minister Major, President Mitterrand, President Ozal of Turkey, Chancellor Kohl this morning,
U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, I’m announcing a greatly expanded and more ambitious relief
effort.”).
131. Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in Kosovo, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. 301, 301 (2000).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. P.M. Office Statement, supra note 77.
135. Matheson, supra note 131, at 301.
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“terrible human tragedy,”136 and “severe humanitarian distress.”137 Second, the
situation must be one with regard to which the Security Council cannot or will
not act. Third, the use of force has to be necessary, proportionate, and limited to
alleviating human suffering. Finally, there appears to be a clear preference for
some degree of international consensus on the need for action, and, at least by
the U.S. view, a preference for multilateral action.
Assuming for the sake of analysis that a right of humanitarian intervention
exists, there would seem to be no question that the scale of the human suffering
in Syria merits such an operation. The conflict has resulted in at least 450,000
dead,138 more than four-and-a-half-million refugees,139 and six-and-a-half-
million internally displaced Syrians.140 There have been countless war crimes,
including direct attacks on civilians, multiple uses of chemical weapons, and
indiscriminate artillery bombardments, as well as the use of weaponry that
poses particular risks to the civilian population, such as cluster munitions, barrel
bombs, and fuel-air bombs.141 The situation is both horrific and ongoing, with
no end to the suffering in sight.
However, the missile strikes were not a direct response to the overall suffer-
ing, but instead only to Syria’s use of chemical weapons. The suffering caused
by the Syrian chemical weapons attack is significantly less than that of any
other example cited above. Additionally, the U.S. missile strikes cannot reason-
ably have been believed to deter any abuses other than the use of the outlawed
weapons. Thus, even though the strikes might strengthen the general case for
humanitarian intervention, they do not appear to qualify as lawful humanitarian
intervention, for they fail to satisfy the quantum of harm criterion.
CONCLUSION: SUBTLE SHIFT IN APPROACH?
It appears certain that many States now view humanitarian intervention as
legitimate in extreme circumstances, if not also lawful. As noted, the fact that
the U.S. missile strikes were justified in part based on the humanitarian suffer-
ing caused by the Syrian use of chemical weapons reinforces the argument for
136. Bush, supra note 110.
137. Basis for Using Force, supra note 24.
138. Priyanka Boghani, A Staggering New Death Toll for Syria’s War—470,000, PBS FRONTLINE
(Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-war-
470000/.
139. Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.
unocha.org/syria.
140. Id.
141. U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Rep., U.N. Doc. A/HCR/S-17/2/Add.1 (2011); U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l
Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Rep., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 (2012); U.N. Human Rights
Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Rep., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50
(2012); U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Rep., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59 (2013); U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Rep., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/58 (2013).
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the existence of such a right. Despite the failure to satisfy the quantum of harm
criterion, in our view, the episode may signal a subtle shift in State attitudes
towards humanitarian intervention.
The determinative factor, in this case, was not the scale of the suffering, but rather
that the attendant suffering resulted from the use of a long-demonized unlawful
weapon that has unspeakable human effects. This conclusion suggests that that the
nature of harm should be considered as a factor to consider vis-a-vis humanitarian
intervention in addition to, or perhaps even in lieu of, the quantum of harm, at least
when there is a risk of recurrence. It is not without note, in this regard, that a number
of States have publically expressed support for the missile strike, including the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Spain, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Turkey.142 Furthermore, France and Germany issued a joint statement implicitly
supporting the U.S. action,143 and senior officials at the EU and NATO have
spoken approvingly of the operation.144 It is inconceivable that these States and
international organizations missed the fact that the chemical weapons attack
resulted in a quantum of suffering that, had other means been used, would have
provoked not a whisper of humanitarian intervention.
To the extent a humanitarian intervention norm exists or is in the process of
emerging, States are plainly according “value” to the nature of the harm they
are seeking to mitigate. Indeed, it was the first use of chemical weapons, not the
fact that the suffering had reached a particular level, that inspired the United
Kingdom’s willingness to embrace humanitarian intervention in Syria. One has
to wonder whether a similar reaction would attend situations involving other
particularly onerous weaponry that has long been outlawed, such as biological,
radiological, or poisonous weapons.
This possibility of a shift in approach to the purported right of humanitarian
intervention is not unprecedented. By its nature, customary international law
evolves in accordance with the conduct of States combined with opinio juris.
This evolutionary dynamic of crystallization is often driven by States acting in
ways that are not contemplated by existing law and, indeed, sometimes contrary
to that law. What we may be witnessing, then, is the slow and somewhat painful
birth of a nascent right in customary international law allowing States to act
forcefully to put an end to the use of particularly repugnant weaponry against a
civilian population, or perhaps even one countenancing forceful State responses
to other egregious forms of terrorizing and massacring civilian populations in
other countries. If, however, this commendable norm of international law is ever
to fully crystallize, States must have the moral courage to set forth their legal
basis for use of force in the form of explicit expressions of opinio juris. Their
failure to do so, among other things, leaves the world less safe.
142. Aisch et al., supra note 8.
143. Id.
144. Arthur Beesley and James Politi, EU and NATO Welcome US Strike on Syria, FIN. TIMES (Apr.
7, 2017).
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